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HEIDEGGERIAN ONTOLOGY: 
A PHILOSOPHIC BASE FOR ARTS AND HUMANITES EDUCATION 
Dian Fetter 
On the Import of Philosophic Presuppositions 
In a very originative sense, though their specific modes of reali-
zation differ, each particular metaphysical system [or model] has tra-
ditionally sought to explicate and similarly understand man's being by 
abstracting his essence from the ontic order or "world" structure it 
[the system] projects -- precisely, in terms of entities, or the totality 
of entities [beings]1. In sum, human "being" has been determined, cate-
gorized, defined according to - and necessarily made to fit - the already 
[or pre-] determined postulate and interpretation of "nature" and its 
ground. From this basis each philosophic position or system suggests and 
necessarily yields, in respective accordance to its primary postulates, a 
different set of educational practices - as well as aesthetic theories 
similarly derivative of their, respectively, pre-established ontic orders. 
Such concepts and theories then do not spring essentially from man's 
experience or existential condition, nor the consideration thereof - but 
from the abstract system which is both their definition and their source. 
They are, as such, and in all cases, fundamentally prescriptive. By ex-
tention, they must necessarily, logically, function [practice] in like 
manner. In consequence, the converse follows evidently - that is - under-
lying each educational judgement, attitude, practice, etc., there is a 
realized or unrealized metaphysical/philosophic assumption which further 
supports broad practical and theoretic implications. 
It is precisely these issues that inhere in the realization that all 
theories of art, art criticism and arts education-in accordance with their 
tenents-presuppose a certain conception of man and the world in which he 
lives.2 
In sum, the relationship between philosophy and education is irrefut-
able; (1) in that one's conception of education is grounded in, thus for-
mulated by a particular philosophic orientation; (2) in that one's concep-
tion of what education is, what art is, as well as what man is, determines 
how and what one is going to teach; and (3) in that the former are con-
tingent on the latter more fundamental distinction and conception, i.e. 
what human being is. 
Precisely because [as exemplified] there is a direct relationship 
between theories and presumptions of what human nature is, to be peda-
gogical considerations it thereby subsumes, I believe that arts/humanities/ 
education, if it is to found a pervasive, working alternative to the tech-
nological construct and mentality must distinguish, philosophically, its 
own ground. 
If this alternative position is to reverse the negation of individual 




perspective and scientific world-interpretation - and lay open the image 
of man locked in its dimension. 
If it is to eradicate the inherently deprecative position assumed in 
the designation of so-called "subjective" realms, it must transcend the 
traditional metaphysical subject-object dichotomy wherein these realms of 
experience are accordingly discounted, use-less in their status as unstable 
truths and isolated relativism. Most importantly, their being reduced 
to those compromises we have not only ignonomously accepted but espoused -
i.e. self expression and freedom of the will. 
If then art is to retain import, justified existence, in a world 
determined by metaphysically conditioned concepts of man, by the concept 
of labor and the power of technology, its relevance must be circumscribed 
in a manner which apprises these circumstances, and recognizes its [arts] 
own distinction as a fundamental source of explication; i.e. of man's 
relationship to world - how and what it means to be. 
But this then transcends the boundaries of traditional aesthetics, its 
predicates and conditioning. That is, traditional theories of art, aesthe-
tics and art criticism are similarly grounded in, determined by and sub-
ordinate to, metaphysical convention and its corre;atove conceptions of 
truth; all respectively functioning in relation to, and in determination 
of, the work of art. In sum, predicated by the self-delineated and deline-
ating schemata resident in each philosophic orientation, the nature of art 
and inquiry in regard to it, founds its thus derivative form, means and 
conceptual ediface. "Application" is similarly wrought, education pro-
ceeds accordingly. 
Therefore, as it pertains to the disclosure and elucidation of the 
origination of these boundaries, we thus call to question the traditional 
aesthetic-theoretic ediface as it has evolved out of the history of meta-
physics, most especially in its inability to circumscribe the essential 
significance of the work of art for the disclosure of truth; what the work 
of art is in truth. If we then further qualify its basic inability to do 
so through its determination of the truth of a work as a correctness that 
can be gauged by the criterion of objectivity, we come, subsequently, to 
the original paradoxes which attach to any ontology that takes its orienta-
tion from thingly reality - as aesthetic theory does. 
There are then three traditional prescriptions as to what makes a thing 
a thing. Ironically, in our analysis of these positions, it becomes evi-
dent that traditional philosophic thought is unable to answer the question 
as to what makes a thing a thing, and cannot, in any of its forms thus 
serve as a guide to understanding the work of art. Yet it is to one of 
these schemata that indeed traditional aesthetics applies whenever there 
is question of such understanding. It is accordingly that the [cited] 
establishment and delineation of the work of art by means of its "thingly" 
character, in all cases thus subsumes the art work as "object" in theoretic 
determination. Truth so postulated refers then to the theoretic, idea-
tional truth of propositional assertion and representation. Its locus is 
thus necessarily relegated to judgement and defined by the criterion of 
objectivity. 
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Yet, in isolation of its constitutive factors, we find that this 
corespondence theory of truth utilized by aesthetic theory fails to 
accommodate the "what is" of truth in art. More widely conclusive, 
is that its origins in the categorical delineation of things, com-
pounded historically within the structure of meta-physical conditions, 
thus correlates with the predominance of technocracy, and the scien-
tific, dichotomized "World-view." Most profoundly, that this scien-
tific, objective and thus, aesthetic truth is not an original incar-
nation of truth, but merely the elaboration of an already overt realm: 
it is thus, and in all cases, ontic and not ontological. 
What must follow from these conclusions? Precisely, that the 
nature of art abides in a dimension disregarded by traditional aesthetics 
and ontology, that the specific nature of artistic and poetic truth has 
not therein been disclosed, that it lies then, not in traditionally de-
termined aesthetic, but [newly conceived] ontological, reflection. 
Propositions and Intents 
The commitment which is thus central to my work is the theoretic 
expostulation of hermeneutics as the philosophic basis of education in 
the arts and humanities; which takes, in accordance with the Heideggerian 
tradition [its originative source of inquiry], its position in the life 
world. Its rationale is thus propounded: man's being in the world, 
supporting ontological discourse into the realm of art and its educational 
dimensions. By extention, art becomes irrevocably bound to the human 
historical-experiential core, its modes of unification. So designated, 
it projects as basic proposition, that that which comes to expression in 
the work of art is the possibilities resident in Being. More precisely, 
that the art work is not primarily aesthetic but ontological; and, that 
there is continuity between the self-understanding potentially attained 
from the work of art and the self-understanding in and through which we 
live. The working of the work is thus synonomous to the disclosure of 
human possibility. 
If to the above, one adds the realization that Heidegger's position 
and intent accomplishes and encompasses the move beyond traditional meta-
physics, that what forms and transforms the Heideggerian perspective is 
the continuity of question as regards the relationship of Being and man, 
that Heidegger consistently over-comes static categories in designation 
of the historic or event character of Being: that the former [categories] 
are those in which we are not only disposed to think but live: we come 
then to understand that in such 'overcoming,' Heidegger offers us a more 
authentic mode of being. It follows from the core of meaning and human 
significance within its circumference, from its ground already present in 
the human situation, the consequence of hermeneutice as theoretic founda-
tion relevant to education in the arts and humanities is thus preordained. 
In sum, we are being concerned with our own meaning. It is for the "human-
ities" to explicate and articulate what science cannot: man's relationship 
to Being: How and what it means, to be. 




Philosophic Ground and Foundation of the Study 
Instructive to the present purpose, it becomes necessary to note 
that the phenomenology of Husserl and the phenomenological hermeneutics 
of Heidegger are significantly different. Husserl emphasized the rigor 
of a presuppositionless philosophy, which, by means of the epoche, 
bracketed out the naive attitude and the empirical ego. In turn, he 
posited the transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental conscious, 
functioning as the basis of analysis and description of essences, and 
thus, absolute subjectivity as the source of meaning; the transcendental 
conscious, thus constituting meaning, becomes the source of apodictic 
evidence and the ultimate justification of theoretic knowledge. Signi-
ficantly, in Husserl's work, consciousness = Being. 
Conversely, Heidegger begins not in the realm of pure consciousness 
and transcendental subjectivity, but in the radical temporality of man 
and world; the facticity of being as more fundamental than human con-
sciousness or human knowledge; man's life and the world as essentially 
historic and finite; being in the world as the source of man's under-
standing. 
Specific to these fundamental distinctions and the purpose of choice, 
it is thereby instructive to note that for Husserl "knowing" the Lebenswelt, 
as lifeworld, necessitates doing so theoretically - i.e. thus not origin-
ating from the historical-experiential dimension of the Lebenswelt it-
self, but from the transcendental vantage point. In this request, his 
presuppositionless position negates, via a process of reduction, the 
historicality of man's understanding within the finite, historic world. 
In consequence, the phenomenological method formalized by Husserl, is 
rethought in the Heideggerian purpose and perspective - not toward a laying 
open of consciousness, but as a means of disclosing Being in its facticity 
and historicality. The hermeneutic dimension is conceived philosophically, 
as synonomous to philosophy itself; thus the basis of accounting for man's 
understanding not as subjective processes, but as our essential way of 
being. This, the hermeneutic element in Heidegger's phenomenology, dis-
tinguishes a decisive thrust from the world of Husserl. 
Deferring the particulars of Heideggerian thought within its structure 
and development, the thus cited work has sought to acknowledge its deriva-
tion from this revolutionary source, nucleus, and referential necessity -
its foundation in the Heideggerian tradition. 
FOOTNOTES 
1
 This is the primary concern of Martin Heidegger's criticism of the tradi-
tions, which, by virtue of its emphasis on beings is synonomous to the 
forgetfulness of Being. 
2
 Moreover, it is again these very fundamental issues and conceptions whose 
status is often accepted as self-evident or "given", or are otherwise un-
conscious, unexamined assumptions which ask - by virtue of their import to 
everything that follows from them - for detailed critical reflections. 
As an evident extension of these considerations, the relevance attached to 
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our critical knowledge of traditions of thought is again circumscribed, 
i.e., as giving substance and meaning as well as philosophic clarity to 
the concepts we hold. 
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